Psychological Egoism

Belisarius by DavidPsychological egoism is the thesis that nosotros are always deep downward motivated past what we perceive to be in our own self-interest.Psychological altruism, on the other hand, is the view that sometimes nosotros can have ultimately altruistic motives. Suppose, for instance, that Pam saves Jim from a burning office building. What ultimately motivated her to do this? It would exist odd to propose that it's ultimately her ain benefit that Pam is seeking. After all, she'south risking her own life in the process. But the psychological egoist holds that Pam's manifestly donating act is ultimately motivated by the goal to benefit herself, whether she is aware of this or not. Pam might have wanted to proceeds a good feeling from being a hero, or to avoid social reprimand that would follow had she not helped Jim, or something along these lines.

Several other egocentric views are related to, merely distinct from psychological egoism. Unlike ethical egoism, psychological egoism is but an empirical merits about what kinds of motives we have, not what they ought to be. So, while the upstanding egoist claims that beingness self-interested in this way is moral, the psychological egoist simply holds that this is how we are. Similarly, psychological egoism is not identical to what is often called "psychological hedonism." Psychological hedonism restricts the range of self-interested motivations to simply pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Thus, information technology is a specific version of psychological egoism.

The story of psychological egoism is rather peculiar.  Though information technology is frequently discussed, it hasn't been explicitly held by many major figures in the history of philosophy. It is most oftentimes attributed to just Thomas Hobbes (1651) and Jeremy Bentham (1781). Most philosophers explicitly pass up the view, largely based on famous arguments from Joseph Butler (1726). Nevertheless, psychological egoism tin be seen as a groundwork assumption of several other disciplines, such equally psychology and economics. Moreover, some biologists have suggested that the thesis can be supported or rejected directly based on evolutionary theory or work in sociobiology.

While psychological egoism is undoubtedly an empirical claim, in that location hasn't ever been a substantial body of experimental data that bears on the debate. Nonetheless, a groovy deal of empirical work beginning in the tardily 20th century has largely filled the void. Testify from biological science, neuroscience, and psychology has stimulated a lively interdisciplinary dialogue. Regardless of whether or not the empirical evidence renders a decisive verdict on the debate, it has certainly enriched discussion of the issue.

Table of Contents

  1. Conceptual Framework for the Debate
    1. The Bare Theses
    2. Egocentric vs. Donating Desires
    3. Ultimate/Intrinsic Desires
    4. Relating Egoism and Altruism
  2. Philosophical Arguments For Egoism
    1. Want Buying
    2. Simplicity and Parsimony
    3. Moral Education
    4. Self-Other Merging
  3. Philosophical Arguments Against Egoism
    1. Butler'due south Stone: Presupposition & Byproducts
    2. Introspection and Common Sense
    3. Unfalsifiability
    4. The Paradox of Egoism
  4. Biological science and Egoism
    1. Evolutionary vs. Psychological Altruism
    2. An Evolutionary Statement Confronting Egoism
  5. Cognitive Science and Egoism
    1. Behavioristic Learning Theory
    2. Neuroscience
    3. Social Psychology
  6. Conclusion
  7. References and Further Reading

1. Conceptual Framework for the Contend

Psychological egoism is a thesis almost motivation, commonly with a focus on the motivation of human being (intentional) action. It is exemplified in the kinds of descriptions we sometimes requite of people'due south actions in terms of hidden, ulterior motives. A famous story involving Abraham Lincoln usefully illustrates this (see Rachels 2003, p. 69). Lincoln was allegedly arguing that we are all ultimately self-interested when he of a sudden stopped to save a grouping of piglets from drowning. His interlocutor seized the moment, attempting to indicate out that Lincoln is a living counter-example to his own theory; Lincoln seemed to be concerned with something other than what he took to exist his ain well-existence. But Lincoln reportedly replied: "I should have had no peace of mind all day had I gone on and left that suffering old sow worrying over those pigs. I did it to get peace of mind, don't y'all see?"

The psychological egoist holds that descriptions of our motivation, like Lincoln'southward, apply to all of us in every instance. The story illustrates that there are many subtle moves for the defender of psychological egoism to make. And then it is important to become a clear thought of the competing egocentric versus altruistic theories and of the terms of the debate between them.

a. The Bare Theses

Egoism is often contrasted with altruism. Although the egoism-altruism debate concerns the possibility of altruism in some sense, the ordinary term "altruism" may non rail the issue that is of primary involvement here.  In at to the lowest degree one ordinary use of the term, for someone to act altruistically depends on her existence motivated solely past a concern for the welfare of another, without whatsoever ulterior motive to simply benefit herself.  Altruism hither is a feature of the motivation that underlies the action (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 199). (Another sense of "altruism"—frequently used in a fairly technical sense in biology—is simply behavioral; see §4a.) To this extent, this ordinary notion of altruism is close to what is of philosophical interest.  Only there are differences.  For instance, ordinarily we seem to only utilise the term "altruism" to adequately atypical deportment, such equally those of great self-sacrifice or heroism.  But the fence about psychological egoism concerns the motivations that underlie all of our deportment (Nagel 1970/1978, p. sixteen, north. ane).

Regardless of ordinary terminology, the view philosophers label "psychological egoism" has certain fundamental features. Developing a clear and precise account of the egoism-altruism debate is more hard than it might seem at first. To make the task easier, we may brainstorm with quite blank and schematic definitions of the positions in the contend (May 2011, p. 27; compare also Rosas 2002, p. 98):

  • Psychological Egoism:  All of our ultimate desires are egoistic.
  • Psychological Altruism:  Some of our ultimate desires are altruistic.

We will utilize the term "desire" here in a rather broad sense to only mean a motivational mental state—what nosotros might ordinarily call a "motive" or "reason" in at least ane sense of those terms. But what is an "ultimate" want, and when is it "altruistic" rather than "egocentric"?  Answering these and related questions will provide the requisite framework for the contend.

b. Egocentric vs. Altruistic Desires

Nosotros tin begin to add substance to our bare theses by characterizing what information technology is to have an donating versus an egoistic desire.  As some philosophers take pointed out, the psychological egoist claims that all of ane'south ultimate desires concern oneself in some sense. However, we must make clear that an egocentric desire exclusively concerns ane'due south ain well-being, do good, or welfare. A malevolent ultimate desire for the destruction of an enemy does non business organization oneself, but it is hardly altruistic (Feinberg 1965/1999, §nine, p. 497; Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 229).

Similarly, despite its mutual use in this context, the term "selfish" is not advisable here either. The psychological egoist claims that we ultimately merely intendance about (what we consider to be) our own welfare, but this needn't e'er corporeality to selfishness. Consider an ultimate desire to take a nap that is well-deserved and won't negatively affect anyone. While this concerns one'due south own benefit, there is no sense in which it is selfish (Henson 1988, §7; Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 227). The term "self-interest" is more than fitting.

With these points in mind, we can characterize egoistic and altruistic desires in the following way:

  • One's desire is egocentric if (and only if) it concerns (what one perceives to be) the do good of oneself and not anyone else.
  • One's desire is donating if (and only if) it concerns (what one perceives to be) the benefit of at least someone other than oneself.

Information technology'southward important that the desire in some sense represents the person equally oneself (or, as the case may be, as some other). For example, suppose that John wants to help put out a burn down in the hair of a human being who appears to exist in front of him, but he doesn't know that he's actually looking into a mirror, and it'south his own hair that'southward afire.  If John'south desire is ultimate and is merely to help the human with his hair in flames, then it is necessary to count his desire as concerning someone other than himself, even though he is in fact the man with his hair on fire (Oldenquist 1980, pp. 27-8; Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 214).

c. Ultimate/Intrinsic Desires

The reason for the focus on ultimate desires is that psychological egoists don't deny that we often have desires that are altruistic. They do claim, however, that all such altruistic desires ultimately depend on an egoistic desire that is more basic. In other words, we have an ulterior motive when we assistance others—one that likely tends to wing beneath the radar of consciousness or introspection.

Thus, nosotros must draw a mutual philosophical distinction between desires that are for a means to an end and desires for an end in itself. Instrumental desires are those desires one has for something every bit a means for something else; ultimate desires are those desires ane has for something equally an end in itself, not equally a means to something else (run into Sober & Wilson 1998, pp. 217-222).  The former are often called "extrinsic desires" and the latter "intrinsic desires" (see e.chiliad. Mele 2003 Ch. 1.8.).  Desires for pleasure and the avoidance of hurting are paradigmatic ultimate desires, since people ofttimes desire these as ends in themselves, not as a mere means to anything else.  But the grade of ultimate desires may include much more than this.

d. Relating Egoism and Altruism

There are two important aspects to highlight regarding how psychological egoism and altruism relate to one another. First, psychological egoism makes a stronger, universal claim that all of our ultimate desires are egoistic, while psychological altruism only makes the weaker claim that some of our ultimate desires are donating.  Thus, the former is a monistic thesis, while the latter is a pluralistic thesis (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 228).  Consequently, psychological egoism is easier to refute than the opposing view.  If one were to successfully demonstrate that some—fifty-fifty just ane—of a person'southward ultimate desires are altruistic, so nosotros tin can safely reject psychological egoism.  For example, if Thomas removes his heel from another'due south gouty toe because he has an ultimate desire that the person benefit from information technology, then psychological egoism is simulated.

2d, the positions in the argue are not exactly the deprival of one another, provided in that location are desires that are neither altruistic nor egoistic (Stich, Doris, & Roedder 2010, sect. ii).  To take an example from Bernard Williams, a "madman" might have an ultimate desire for "a chimpanzees' tea party to exist held in the cathedral" (1973, p. 263). He does not desire this as a means to some other cease, such as enjoyment at the sight of such a spectacle (he might, for instance, secure this in his volition for afterwards his decease).  Bold the desire for such a tea political party is neither altruistic nor egoistic (because information technology doesn't have to exercise with anyone'southward well-existence), would it settle the egoism-altruism fence? Not entirely. Information technology would show that psychological egoism is imitation, since it would demonstrate that some of our ultimate desires are not egocentric. However, it would not show that psychological altruism is true, since it does not show that some of our ultimate desires are altruistic.  Likewise, suppose that psychological altruism is simulated because none of our ultimate desires concern the benefit of others.  If that is true, psychological egoism is non thereby true.  It too could exist false if we sometimes have ultimate desires that are not egoistic, like the madman's.  The indicate is that the theses are contraries: they cannot both be truthful, just they can both be fake.

2. Philosophical Arguments For Egoism

Philosophers don't take much sympathy for psychological egoism.  Indeed, the only major figures in the history of philosophy to endorse the view explicitly are arguably Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham.  Some might also include Aristotle (compare Feinberg 1965/1999, p. 501) and John Stuart Manufactory (compare Sidgwick 1874/1907, ane.iv.2.1), only there is some room for interpreting them otherwise. Hobbes explicitly states in Leviathan (1651/1991):

…no man giveth but with intention of skillful to himself, because souvenir is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every human being his own good; of which, if men run into they shall be frustrated, in that location will be no start of benevolence or trust, nor consequently of common help. (Ch. XV, p. 47)

In a similar vein, Bentham famously opens his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1781/1991) with this:

Nature has placed flesh under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasance. Information technology is for them alone to point out what we ought to exercise, besides equally to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of correct and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. (p. 313)

Here Bentham appears to endorse a specific version of psychological egoism, namely psychological hedonism. This view restricts the kind of self-involvement nosotros can ultimately want to pleasure or the abstention of pain.  Unfortunately, Hobbes and Bentham don't offering much in the manner of arguments for these views; they tend to but presume them.

a. Desire Ownership

One tempting argument for psychological egoism is based on what seem to be conceptual truths most (intentional) action.  For instance, many hold that all of one'south actions are motivated by ane'southward own desires.  This might seem to straight back up psychological egoism considering it shows that we are all out to satisfy our own desires (compare Hobbes).  In his famous Fifteen Sermons, Bishop Butler (1726/1991) anticipates such an argument for the universality of egocentric desires (or "cocky-love") in the post-obit manner:

[B]ecause every particular affection is a man's own, and the pleasure arising from its gratification his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such particular affection must be called self-love; according to this mode of speaking, no fauna whatever tin can possibly act but only from self-love. (Sermon XI, p. 366)

However, equally Butler goes on to say, this line of argument rests on a mistake or at least a play on words.  Many philosophers have afterwards reinforced Butler'south objection, often pointing to 2 intertwined confusions: i based on our desires being ours, another based on equivocation on the give-and-take "satisfaction." On the former confusion, C. D. Broad says "it is true that all impulses belong to a self" but  "it is not truthful that the object of any of them is the full general happiness of the self who owns them" (1930/2000, p. 65).

Similarly, the 2d confusion fails to distinguish between what Bernard Williams calls "desiring the satisfaction of ane's want" and "desiring one's own satisfaction" (1973, p. 261).  The word "satisfaction" in the latter case is the more ordinary use involving one's own pleasure or happiness.  If all deportment are motivated past a desire for this, so psychological egoism is indeed established. But the basic consideration from the theory of activeness we began with was but that all actions are motivated past a desire of one's ain, which is meant to be satisfied.  However, this employs a different notion of satisfaction, which just means that the person got what she wanted (Feinberg 1965/1999, p. 496).  The claim that everyone is out to satisfy their ain desires is a fairly uninteresting one, since it doesn't testify that we are motivated past self-interest.  If Female parent Teresa did have an altruistic desire for the do good of another, information technology is no count against her that she sought to satisfy information technology—that is, bring virtually the benefit of another. This argument for psychological egoism, and then, seems to rely on an obviously imitation view of self-interest every bit desire-satisfaction.

b. Simplicity and Parsimony

A major theoretical attraction of psychological egoism is parsimony.  Information technology provides a simple business relationship of human motivation and offers a unified explanation of all our deportment. Although deportment may vary in content, the ultimate source is self-interest: doing well at one'due south task is merely to gain the favor of i'due south boss; returning a wallet is merely to avert the pang of guilt that would follow keeping it; maxim "thank you" for a meal is simply to avoid social reprimand for failing to adjust to etiquette; so on.

1 might dispute whether psychological egoism is whatsoever more parsimonious than psychological altruism (Sober & Wilson 1998, pp. 292-iii).  More importantly, however, information technology is no argument for a view that it is simpler than its competitors. Perhaps we might employ Ockham's Razor as a sort of tie-breaker to adjudicate between ii theories when they are equal in all other respects, but this involves more than just simplicity (Sober & Wilson 1998, pp. 293-five).  As David Hume puts it, psychological egoism shouldn't be based solely on "that dear of simplicity which has been the source of much faux reasoning in philosophy" (1751/1998, p. 166). The heart of the debate then is whether in that location are other reasons to adopt ane view over the other.

c. Moral Education

Peradventure the psychological egoist needn't appeal to parsimony or erroneous conceptions of cocky-interest. Bentham, after all, suggests that ordinary feel shows that we are ultimately motivated to gain pleasure or avoid pain (1781/1991, Ch. 3). Possibly i could extrapolate an argument on behalf of psychological egoism along the following lines (Feinberg 1965/1999, sect. 4, p. 495). Feel shows that people must exist taught to intendance for others with carrots and sticks—with reward and punishment. And so seemingly altruistic ultimate desires are merely instrumental to egoistic ones; we come to believe that nosotros must be concerned with the interests of others in order to proceeds rewards and avoid punishment for ourselves (compare the argument in §5a).

This line of reasoning is rather difficult to evaluate given that it rests on an empirical merits about moral development and learning.  Ordinary experience does prove that sometimes it's necessary to impose sanctions on children for them to be squeamish and caring. Simply even if this occurs oftentimes, it doesn't back up a universal claim that it ever does. Moreover, at that place is a growing trunk of evidence gathered by developmental psychologists indicating that immature children have a natural, unlearned concern for others. There is some evidence, for example, that children as young every bit 14-months will spontaneously assistance a person they believe is in need (Warneken & Tomasello 2007).  It seems implausible that children have learned at such a young age that this behavior will exist benefit themselves. On the other hand, such empirical results exercise non necessarily show that the ultimate motivation behind such action is donating. The psychological egoist could argue that we nonetheless possess ultimately egoistic desires (perhaps we are just born assertive that concern for others will benefit oneself).  However, the developmental evidence still undermines the moral instruction argument by indicating that our concern for the welfare others is not universally learned from birth past sanctions of reward and punishment.

d. Self-Other Merging

Some other argument for psychological egoism relies on the thought that nosotros often blur our conception of ourselves and others when we are benevolent. Consider the paradigm of apparently selfless motivation: concern for family, especially one'southward children. Francis Hutcheson anticipates the objection when he imagines a psychological egoist proclaiming: "Children are not only made of our bodies, simply resemble us in trunk and mind; they are rational agents as we are, and we just love our own likeness in them" (1725/1991, p. 279, Raphael sect. 327). And this might seem to be supported by recent empirical research. Later on all, social psychologists have discovered that we tend to feel more than empathy for others we perceive to be in need when they are similar to us in diverse respects and when we take on their perspective (Batson 1991; see §5b). In fact, some psychologists have endorsed precisely this sort of self-other merging statement for an egoistic view (for example, Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, and Neuberg 1997).

Ane might doubt, yet, whether a self-other merging account is able to explain helping behavior in an egoistic way. For instance, it would be quite implausible to say that we literally believe we exist in two different bodies when feeling empathy for someone. The most apparent reading of the proposal is that nosotros conceptually blur the distinction between ourselves and others in the relevant cases. Even so this would seem to require, reverse to fact, that our behavior reflects this blurring. If we think of the purlieus between ourselves and another equally indeterminate, presumably our helping beliefs would reflect such indeterminacy. (For further discussion, run across Hutcheson 1725/1991, pp. 279-80; Batson 2011, ch. 6; May 2011.)

3. Philosophical Arguments Against Egoism

Considering the arguments, the case for psychological egoism seems rather weak. But is there anything to exist said directly against it? This section examines some of the nearly famous arguments philosophers accept proposed against the view.

a. Butler's Rock: Presupposition & Byproducts

Bishop Joseph Butler provides a famous argument against psychological egoism (focusing on hedonism) in his Fifteen Sermons.  The key passage is the following:

That all detail appetites and passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them, is manifested from hence; that at that place could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness betwixt the object and the passion: there could be no enjoyment or please from one thing more than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a rock, if there were non an amore or appetite to one thing more than some other. (1726/1991, Sermon XI, p. 365)

Many philosophers have championed  this argument, which Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson (1998) have dubbed "Butler'southward rock." Broad (1930/2000), for case, writes that Butler "killed the theory [of psychological egoism] so thoroughly that he sometimes seems to the mod reader to be flogging dead horses" (p. 55).

Butler'south idea is that the experience of pleasance upon attaining something presupposes (or at to the lowest degree strongly indicates) a desire for the thing attained, non the pleasure itself. After all, we typically do not experience pleasure upon getting something (like food) unless nosotros want information technology. The pleasure that accompanies the fulfillment of our desires is often a mere byproduct of our prior want for the thing that gave united states of america pleasure. Ofttimes we experience pleasure upon getting what we want precisely because we wanted what gave us pleasance. Consider, for example, getting second identify in a race. This would make a runner happy if she wants to get second place; but it would not if she doesn't want this at all (e.thou. she only wants first place).

While Butler'due south version of the argument may be overly aggressive in various respects (Sidgwick 1874/1907, 1.4.two.3; Sober and Wilson 1998, p. 278), the best version is probably something like the following (compare the "disinterested benignancy" argument in Feinberg 1965/1999, §c8):

  1. Sometimes people do good from helping others (e.g. experience pleasure).
  2. Sometimes such benefit presupposes a desire for what generated it (e.g. food), non for the resulting benefit.
  3. And then sometimes people desire things other than self-interest.
  4. Therefore: Psychological egoism is false .

The basic thought is that pleasure (or self-interest more often than not) can't be our universal business organisation because having information technology sometimes presupposes a desire for something other than pleasure itself. Many philosophers have endorsed this sort of argument, non only against hedonism but more generally against egoism (Hume 1751/1998, App. 2.12; Broad 1950/1952; Nagel 1970/1978, p. 80, north. 1; Feinberg 1965/1999).

Sober and Wilson, yet, make the instance that such arguments are seriously flawed at least because "the determination does not follow from the premises" (1998, p. 278).That is, the premises, even if true, fail to plant the decision. The main trouble is that such arguments tell us nothing about which desires are ultimate . Even if the experience of pleasure sometimes presupposes a want for the pleasurable object, information technology is still left open up whether the desire for what generated the pleasure is merely instrumental to a desire for pleasure (or some other course of self-interest). Consider the post-obit causal chain, using "→" to mean "caused" (see Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 278):

Want for food → Eating → Pleasure

Co-ordinate to Butler, the experience of pleasure upon eating some food allows us to infer the existence of a want for food. This is all the argument gets us. Notwithstanding Butler's opponent, the egoist, maintains that the desire for food is subsequent to and dependent on an ultimate desire for pleasance (or some other form of cocky-interest):

Ultimate desire for pleasure → Desire for food → Eating → Pleasure

This egoistic picture is entirely compatible with Butler's claims about presupposition. Then, even if the premises are true, information technology does not follow that egoism is imitation.

Butler would demand a stronger premise, such as: pleasure presupposes an ultimate want for what generated it, not for the resulting do good. Merely this revision would plausibly make the argument question-begging. The new premise seems to corporeality to nothing more the deprival of psychological egoism: sometimes people take  an ultimate desire for something other than self-interest. At the very least, the statement is dialectically unhelpful —it offers premises in back up of the conclusion that are every bit controversial equally the decision is, and for similar reasons.

Nevertheless, a general lesson can clearly be gained from arguments like Butler's. Psychological egoists cannot plant their view only past pointing to the pleasance or self-benefit that accompanies so many actions. Subsequently all, ofttimes self-benefit only seems to be what we ultimately desire, though a closer look reveals benefits like pleasure are likely justbyproducts while the proximate want is for that which generates them. As Hume puts it, sometimes "we are impelled immediately to seek detail objects, such as fame or ability, or vengeance without any regard to involvement; and when these objects are attained a pleasing enjoyment ensues, as the upshot of our indulged affections" (1751/1998, App. 2.12, emphasis added). Perhaps Butler'south bespeak is best seen as a formidable objection to a sure kind of argument for egoism, rather than a positive statement against the theory.

b. Introspection and Common Sense

A simple argument confronting psychological egoism is that it seems obviously false.  As Francis Hutcheson proclaims: "An honest farmer will tell you, that he studies the preservation and happiness of his children, and loves them without any design of good to himself" (1725/1991, p. 277, Raphael sect. 327). Likewise, Hume rhetorically asks, "What involvement can a fond female parent take in view, who loses her health by assiduous attendance on her sick kid, and afterwards languishes and dies of grief, when freed, past its death, from the slavery of that attendance?" (1751/1998, App. 2.9, p. 167).  Building on this observation, Hume takes the "most obvious objection" to psychological egoism to be that:

…as it is reverse to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions, there is required the highest stretch of philosophy to establish so boggling a paradox. To the virtually careless observer in that location appear to be such dispositions as benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, friendship, compassion, gratitude. […] And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must be admitted, till some hypothesis be discovered, which by penetrating deeper into man nature, may evidence the former affections to exist aught only modifications of the latter. (1751/1998, App. ii.half-dozen, p. 166)

Here Hume is offering a burden-shifting statement.  The idea is that psychological egoism is implausible on its confront, offering strained accounts of apparently altruistic deportment. So the burden of proof is on the egoist to show u.s.a. why we should believe the view; yet the attempts so far have "hitherto proved fruitless," co-ordinate to Hume (1751/1998, App. two.vi, p. 166). Similarly, C. D. Broad (1950/1952) and Bernard Williams (1973, pp. 262-3) consider various examples of deportment that seem implausible to characterize as ultimately motivated by cocky-interest.

Given the arguments, it is still unclear why we should consider psychological egoism to be obviously untrue.  Ane might appeal to introspection or common sense; but neither is particularly powerful.  Starting time, the consensus amongst psychologists is that a smashing number of our mental states, fifty-fifty our motives, are not accessible to consciousness or cannot reliably exist reported on through the use of introspection (encounter, for case, Nisbett and Wilson 1977). While introspection, to some extent, may exist a decent source of knowledge of our own minds, it is fairly suspect to decline an empirical claim about potentially unconscious motivations.  Besides, one might report universally egoistic motives based on introspection (due east.m. Mercer 2001, pp. 229-30).  Second, shifting the burden of proof based on common sense is rather limited. Sober and Wilson (1998, p. 288) go and so far as to say that we have "no concern taking common sense at face value" in the context of an empirical hypothesis. Even if we disagree with their claim and let a larger role for shifting burdens of proof via common sense, information technology notwithstanding may have express utilise, particularly when the common sense view might exist reasonably bandage as supporting either position in the egoism-altruism argue.  Here, instead of appeals to common sense, it would exist of greater apply to employ more secure philosophical arguments and rigorous empirical show.

c. Unfalsifiability

Some other pop complaint virtually psychological egoism is that information technology seems to exist immune to empirical refutation; it is "unfalsifiable." And this is frequently taken to be a criterion for an empirical theory: any view that isn't falsifiable isn't a genuine, credible scientific theory (encounter Karl Popper's Falsificationism). The worry for psychological egoism is that it will fail to meet this criterion if any commonly accepted altruistic action can be explained abroad as motivated past some sort of self-involvement. Joel Feinberg, for case, writes:

Until nosotros know what they [psychological egoists] would count every bit unselfish behavior, we can't very well know what they mean when they say that all voluntary behavior is selfish. And at this point we may suspect that they are belongings their theory in a "privileged position"—that of immunity to evidence, that they would let no believable behavior to count every bit show against information technology. What they say then, if true, must exist true in virtue of the way they define—or redefine—the discussion "selfish." And in that case, it cannot be an empirical hypothesis. (1965/1999, §18, p. 503; see also §§14-nineteen)

As nosotros accept seen (§1b), psychological egoism needn't hold that all our ultimate desires are selfish. But Feinberg'southward point is that nosotros need to know what would count equally empirical evidence against the existence of an egoistic ultimate desire.

This objection to psychological egoism has three substantial bug. First, falsification criteria for empirical theories are problematic and have come under heavy assault. In addition information technology's unclear why we should think the view is false. Possibly it is a bad scientific theory or a view we shouldn't care much near, simply it is not thereby false. 2d, whatsoever problems that afflict psychological egoism on this front volition likewise apply to the opposing view (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 290). After all, psychological altruism is a pluralistic thesis that includes both egocentric and altruistic motives. Third, and most importantly, a charitable construal of psychological egoism renders it falsifiable. As we have seen, psychological egoists have a clear account of what would falsify it: an ultimate desire that is not egoistic. While it may be difficult to discover the ultimate motives of people, the view is in principle falsifiable. In fact, it is empirically testable, every bit nosotros shall see below.

d. The Paradox of Egoism

Another pop objection to various forms of psychological egoism is ofttimes called "the paradox of hedonism," which was primarily popularized by Henry Sidgwick (1874/1907, 2.3.two.three). It is commonly directed at psychological hedonism, but the problem can be extended to psychological egoism generally.

When the target is just hedonism, the "paradox" is that we tend to reach more pleasure by focusing on things other than pleasure.  Likewise, when directed at egoism generally, the idea is that we will tend not to benefit ourselves past focusing on our ain benefit. Consider someone, Jones, who is ultimately concerned with his own well-being, not the interests of others (the example is adjusted from Feinberg 1965/1999, p. 498, sect. 11).  Two things will seemingly hold: (a) such a person would eventually lack friends, close relationships, etc. and (b) this will pb to much unhappiness. This seems problematic for a theory that says all of our ultimate desires are for our own well-being.

Despite its popularity, this sort of objection to psychological egoism is quite questionable. At that place are several worries nearly the bounds of the statement, such as the claim that ultimate concern for oneself diminishes ane's ain well-beingness (see Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 280).  Virtually chiefly, the paradox is only potentially an effect for a version of egoism that prescribes ultimate concern for oneself, such every bit normative egoism (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 280). The futility of ultimate concern for oneself can only undermine claims such as "Nosotros should only ultimately care about our own well-being" since this allegedly would not lead to happiness. Merely psychological egoism is a descriptive thesis. Fifty-fifty if egoistic ultimate desires pb to unhappiness, that would just show that egoistically motivated people volition find this unfortunate.

4. Biology and Egoism

Despite its widespread rejection among philosophers, philosophical arguments confronting psychological egoism aren't overwhelmingly powerful. However, the theses in this debate are ultimately empirical claims about human motivation.  So we tin also look to more empirical disciplines, such every bit biological science and psychology, to accelerate the debate. Biology in item contains an abundance of literature on altruism. Simply, as nosotros will meet, much of it is rather tangential to the thesis of psychological altruism.

a. Evolutionary vs. Psychological Altruism

The ordinary (psychological) sense of "altruism" is unlike from altruism as discussed in biological science.  For example, sociobiologists, such every bit Due east. O. Wilson, ofttimes theorize about the biological footing of altruism by focusing on the behavior of non-homo animals. Simply this is altruism only in the sense of helpful behavior that seems to be at some cost to the helper.  Information technology says nix about the motivations for such behavior, which is of interest to us hither. Similarly, "altruism" is a label unremarkably used in a technical sense as a problem for evolutionary theory (run into Altruism and Group Selection).  What nosotros might separately label evolutionary altruism occurs whenever an organism "reduces its own fettle and augments the fettle of others" regardless of the motivation behind it (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 199). Distinguishing the psychological sense of "altruism" from other uses of the term is crucial if we are to look to biological science to contribute to the debate on ultimate desires.

Given the multiple uses of terms, word of altruism and self-interest in evolutionary theory can often seem directly relevant to the psychological egoism-altruism debate.  I might think, for case, that basic facts near evolution bear witness we're motivated by self-interest. Consider our desire for h2o. Nosotros have this perhaps solely because it enhanced the evolutionary "fitness" of our ancestors, past helping them stay alive and thus to propagate their genes. And evolutionary theory plausibly uncovers this sort of cistron-centered story for many features of organisms. Richard Dawkins offers us some ideas of this sort. Although he emphasizes that the term "selfish," as he applies it to genes, is merely metaphorical, he says "we have the ability to defy the selfish genes of our birth… let us try to teach generosity and altruism because we are born selfish (1976/2006, p. 3).

But nosotros should be careful not to allow the self-centered origin of our traits overshadow the traits themselves. Fifty-fifty if all of our desires are due to evolutionary adaptations (which is a strong claim), this is only the origin of them. Consider once again the want for water. It might exist only because it tin can help propagate one'southward genes, merely the desire is all the same for water, non to propagate one's genes (compare the Genetic Fallacy). As Simon Blackburn points out, "Dawkins is following a long tradition in implying that biology carries simple letters for understanding the sociology and psychology of man beings" (1998, p. 146).  To be fair, in a later edition of The Selfish Gene, Dawkins recognizes his folly and asks the reader to ignore such "rogue" sentences (p. ix).  In whatsoever event, we must avoid what Blackburn polemically calls the "biologist's fallacy" of "inferring the 'truthful' psychology of the person from the fact that his or her genes take proved good at replicating over time" (p. 147).  The bespeak is that we must avoid unproblematic leaps from biological science to psychology without substantial argument (run into also Stich et al. 2010, sect. three).

b. An Evolutionary Argument Against Egoism

Philosopher Elliott Sober and biologist David Sloan Wilson (1998) have made careful and sophisticated arguments for the falsity of psychological egoism directly from considerations in evolutionary biology. Their contention is the following: "'Natural selection is unlikely to have given us purely egoistic motives" (p. 12).  To establish this, they focus on parental care, an other-regarding beliefs in humans, whose mechanism is plausibly due to natural option. Assuming such behavior is mediated by what the organism believes and desires, we tin inquire into the kinds of mental mechanisms that could have evolved. The crucial question becomes: Is it more probable that such a mechanism for parental care would, as psychological egoism holds, involve only egoistic ultimate desires?  To respond this question, Sober and Wilson focus on simply i version of egoism, and what they accept to be the about difficult to abnegate: psychological hedonism (p. 297). The hedonistic mechanism e'er begins with the ultimate desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The mechanism consistent with psychological altruism, yet, is pluralistic: some ultimate desires are hedonistic, but others are altruistic.

According to Sober and Wilson, at that place are three main factors that could touch on the likelihood that a machinery evolved: availability, reliability, and energetic efficiency (pp. 305-8). Beginning, the genes that give rise to the mechanism must be available in the pool for pick. 2d, the mechanism mustn't disharmonize with the organism's reproductive fitness; they must reliably produce the relevant fettle-enhancing outcome (such as viability of offspring).  And third, they must practise this efficiently, without yielding a meaning price to the organism's own fettle-enhancing resources. Sober and Wilson find no reason to believe that a hedonistic machinery would be more or less available or energetically efficient. The key difference, they contend, is reliability: "Pluralism was simply as available every bit hedonism, it was more reliable, and hedonism provides no advantage in terms of energetic efficiency" (p. 323).

Sober and Wilson make several arguments for the claim that the pluralistic machinery is more reliable. But one key disadvantage of a hedonistic mechanism, they argue, is that it's heavily "mediated by beliefs" (p. 314). For example, in lodge to produce parental intendance given the ultimate want for pleasure, 1 must believe that helping ane'south child will provide ane with sufficient pleasure over competing alternative courses of activity:

(Ultimate) Desire for Pleasance → Believe Helping Provides Nigh Pleasure → Desire to Help…

Moreover, such behavior must be true, otherwise information technology's likely the instrumental want to assist volition eventually extinguish, then the fitness-enhancing result of parental care won't occur. The pluralistic model, however, is comparatively less complicated since information technology can merely deploy an ultimate desire to help:

(Ultimate) Desire to Assistance…

Since the pluralistic mechanism doesn't rely on every bit many beliefs, it is less susceptible to lack of bachelor evidence for maintaining them. So yielding the fitness-enhancing outcome of parental care will be less vulnerable to disruption. Sober and Wilson (p. 314) liken the hedonistic mechanism to a Rube Goldberg machine, partly because it accomplishes its goal through overly complex means. Each link in the chain is susceptible to error, which makes the mechanism less reliable at yielding the relevant outcome.

Such arguments have not gone undisputed (see, for case, Stich et al. 2010, sect. three). Yet they notwithstanding provide a sophisticated style to connect evolutionary considerations with psychological egoism.  In the next section nosotros'll consider more direct ways for addressing the egoism-altruism debate empirically.

5. Cognitive Science and Egoism

Psychological egoism is an empirical merits; however, considerations from biology provide but i route to addressing the egoism-altruism debate empirically. Another, perhaps more direct, approach is to examine empirical piece of work on the mind itself.

a. Behavioristic Learning Theory

In the 20th century, one of the earliest philosophical discussions of egoism as it relates to research in psychology comes from Michael Slote (1964). He argues that there is at least potentially a footing for psychological egoism in behavioristic theories of learning, championed specially past psychologists such equally B. F. Skinner. Slote writes that such theories "posit a certain number of basically 'selfish,' unlearned chief drives or motives (like hunger, thirst, sleep, elimination, and sex), and explain all other, higher-order drives or motives as derived genetically from the primary ones via certain 'laws of reinforcement'" (p. 530). This theory importantly makes the boosted claim that the "higher-social club" motives, including altruistic ones, are not "functionally autonomous." That is, they are simply instrumental to ("functionally dependent" on) the egocentric ultimate desires. According to Slote, the basic back up for functional dependence is the post-obit: If "we cutting off all reinforcement of [the instrumental desire] by primary rewards (rewards of primary [egoistic] drives)," then the donating desire "actually does extinguish" (p. 531). Thus, all altruistic desires are just instrumental to ultimately egocentric ones; we have but learned through conditioning that benefiting others benefits ourselves. That, according to Slote, is what the behavioristic learning theory maintains.

Like the moral education argument, Slote'southward is vulnerable to work in developmental psychology indicating that some prosocial behavior is not conditioned (see §2c). Moreover, behavioristic approaches throughout psychology accept been widely rejected in the wake of the "cognitive revolution." Learning theorists now recognize mechanisms that become quite beyond the tools of behaviorism (beyond mere classical and operant workout).  Slote does only claim to take established the following highly qualified thesis: "It would seem, and so, that, as psychology stands today, there is at least some reason to think that the psychological theory we have been discussing may be true" (p. 537); and he appears to pass up psychological egoism in his later work. In any result, more than contempo empirical research is more than apt and informative to this debate.

b. Neuroscience

Philosopher Carolyn Morillo (1990) has defended a version of psychological hedonism based on more recent neuroscientific work primarily done on rats.  Morillo argues for a "strongly monistic" theory of motivation that is grounded in "internal reward events," which holds that "we [ultimately] desire these reward events considering nosotros notice them to be intrinsically satisfying" (p. 173).  The back up for her claim is primarily evidence that the "reward centre" of the brain, which is the spring of motivation, is the same equally the "pleasure center," which indicates that the basic advantage driving action is pleasure.

Morillo admits though that the idea is "highly speculative" and based on "empirical straws in the wind." Furthermore, philosopher Timothy Schroeder (2004) argues that later on piece of work in neuroscience casts serious uncertainty on the identification of the reward event with pleasure. In brusk, by manipulating rats' brains, neuroscientist Kent Berridge and colleagues take provided substantial evidence that existence motivated to get something is entirely separable from "liking" it (that is, from its generating pleasure). Against Morillo, Schroeder concludes that the data are improve explained by the hypothesis that the reward center of the brain "tin can indirectly activate the pleasure heart than past the hypothesis that either is such a center" (p. 81, emphasis added; see also Schroeder, Roskies, and Nichols 2010, pp. 105-six.)

c. Social Psychology

Other empirical work that bears on the existence of altruistic motives can be constitute in the study of empathy-induced helping behavior. Beginning around the 1980s, C. Daniel Batson and other social psychologists addressed the argue caput on by examining such phenomena. Batson (1991; 2011), in particular, argues that the experiments conducted provide evidence for an altruistic model, the empathy-altruism hypothesis, which holds that as "empathic feeling for a person in need increases, altruistic motivation to accept that person's need relieved increases" (1991, p. 72). In other words, the hypothesis states that empathy tends to induce in us ultimate desires for the well-being of someone other than ourselves. If true, this entails that psychological egoism is false.

Batson comes to this determination by concentrating on a robust effect of empathy on helping behavior discovered in the 1970s. The empathy-helping relationship is the finding that the feel of relatively high empathy for some other perceived to be in need causes people to aid the other more than relatively low empathy. However, as Batson recognizes, this doesn't constitute psychological altruism, considering information technology doesn't specify whether the ultimate desire is altruistic or egoistic. Given that there can be both egoistic and altruistic explanations of the empathy-helping human relationship, Batson and others have devised experiments to test them.

The general experimental approach involves placing ordinary people in situations in which they take an opportunity to help someone they recollect is in need while manipulating other variables in the state of affairs.  The purpose is to provide circumstances in which egoistic versus altruistic explanations of empathy-induced helping behavior brand different predictions nearly what people volition do.  Different hypotheses then provide either egocentric or donating explanations of why the subjects ultimately chose to aid or offer to help. (For detailed discussions of the background assumptions involved here, see Batson 1991, pp. 64-67; Sober & Wilson 1998, Ch. 6; Stich, Doris, and Roedder 2010.)

Several egoistic explanations of the empathy-helping human relationship are in competition with the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Each one claims that experiences of relatively loftier empathy ("empathic arousal") causes subjects to help but because it induces an egocentric ultimate desire; the desire to assist the other is solely instrumental to the ultimate desire to benefit oneself.  However, the experiments seem to rule out all the plausible (and some rather implausible) egoistic explanations.  For case, if those feeling higher amounts of empathy help merely because they want to reduce the discomfort of the state of affairs, then they should assist less oftentimes when they know their task is over and they can simply exit the experiment without helping. Nonetheless this prediction has been repeatedly disconfirmed (Batson 1991, ch. eight). A host of experiments have similarly disconfirmed a range of egoistic hypotheses. The cumulative results evidently show that the empathy-helping relationship is non put in place by egocentric ultimate desires to either:

  • relieve personal distress (east.g. discomfort from the state of affairs),
  • avert self-punishment (e.yard. feelings of guilt),
  • avoid social-punishment (e.g. looking bad to others),
  • obtain rewards from self or others (e.g. praise, pride),
  • gain a mood-enhancing experience (east.chiliad. feel glad someone was helped).

Furthermore, according to Batson, the information all adapt to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, which claims that empathic arousal induces an ultimate desire for the person in need to be helped (see Batson 1991; for a relatively brief review, see Batson & Shaw 1991).

Some take argued against Batson that there are plausible egocentric explanations not ruled out by the data collected thus far (e.g. Cialdini et al. 1997; Sober & Wilson 1998, Ch. 8; Stich, Doris, and Roedder 2010). Withal, many egocentric explanations have been tested along like lines and announced to be disconfirmed. While Batson admits that more studies can and should be done on this topic, he ultimately concludes that we are at least tentatively justified in believing that the empathy-altruism hypothesis is true. Thus, he contends that psychological egoism is fake: "Contrary to the beliefs of Hobbes, La Rochefoucauld, Mandeville, and virtually all psychologists, altruistic concern for the welfare of others is inside the homo repertoire" (1991, p. 174).

6. Decision

It seems philosophical arguments against psychological egoism aren't quite every bit powerful as nosotros might expect given the widespread rejection of the theory amidst philosophers. So the theory is arguably more difficult to refute than many accept tended to suppose. It is important to keep in mind, still, that the theory makes a rather strong, universal claim that all of our ultimate desires are egoistic, making information technology easy to bandage doubt on such a view given that it takes only ane counter-example to refute it.

Another important conclusion is that empirical work can contribute to the egoism-altruism contend. There is now a wealth of data emerging in various disciplines that addresses this fascinating and important argue well-nigh the nature of human motivation. While some accept argued that the jury is even so out, it is clear that the ascension interdisciplinary dialogue is both welcome and constructive. Perhaps with the philosophical and empirical arguments taken together we can declare substantial progress.

seven. References and Farther Reading

  • Batson, C. D.  (1991). The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-Psychological Answer. Hillsdale, NJ:  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
    • Batson's first book-length defense of the existence of altruism. Examines a wide range of empirical data from social psychology for the empathy-altruism hypothesis.
  • Batson, C. D. (2011). Altruism in Humans. New York: Oxford University Printing.
    • An updated book-length defence force of the existence of altruism in humans. Attempts to rebut challenges to the empathy-altruism hypothesis based on experiments done since the early 1990s.
  • Batson, C. D & L. L. Shaw (1991). "Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives." Psychological Enquiry Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 107–122.
    • An overview of the experimental evidence for altruism. Examines the experimental bear witness for the empathy-altruism hypothesis more briefly than Batson'due south book.
  • Bentham, Jeremy (1781/1991). Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Reprinted in role in Raphael (1991), Vol. 2, pp. 313–346.
    • Bentham's famous treatise defending utilitarianism. One of his basic assumptions virtually human psychology is psychological hedonism.
  • Blackburn, Simon (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • A broadly Humean account of motivation and ethics that covers, among others things, some problems at the intersection of egoism and biology (see ch. 5).
  • Broad, C. D. (1930/2000). V Types of Ethical Theory. Reprinted in 2000, London: Routledge. (Originally published in 1930 by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd.)
    • A discussion of the upstanding theories of Spinoza, Butler, Hume, Kant, and Sidgwick. Broad champions Butler's arguments against psychological egoism, proverb Butler thoroughly "killed the theory."
  • Wide, C. D. (1950/1952). "Egoism as a Theory of Man Motives." The Hibbert Journal Vol. 48, pp. 105–114. (Reprinted in his Ethics and the History of Philosophy: Selected Essays, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952.)
    • Broad'southward famous discussion of psychological egoism in which he provides a rich framework for the debate. He develops what takes to be the most plausible version of psychological egoism, but concludes that it is rather implausible.
  • Butler, Joseph (1726/1991). Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel. Reprinted in part in Raphael (1991), Vol. I, pp. 325–377.  (Originally published by Hilliard and Brown in Cambridge; Hilliard, Gray, Petty, and Wilkins in Boston.)
    • Butler'southward famous text discussing, among other things, psychological egoism and hedonism, though non under those labels. He mounts a famous argument confronting psychological hedonism in particular.
  • Cialdini, Robert B., S. L. Brown, B. P. Lewis, C. Luce, & Due south. L. Neuberg (1997). "Reinterpreting the Empathy-Altruism Human relationship: When One Into One Equals Oneness" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73 (3): 481-494.
    • A widely cited criticism of Batson'due south empathy-altruism hypothesis. The authors present empirical evidence that empathy tends to induce ultimately egoistic, not altruistic, motives by blurring 1's distinction between oneself and the other for whom empathy is felt.
  • Dawkins, Richard (1976/2006). The Selfish Gene. 30th anniversary edition with new introduction, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. (Originally published in 1976.)
    • Famous business relationship of the process of development, turning the focus on genes, rather than the organism, and their propensity to replicate themselves via natural selection (hence the idea of a "selfish" gene).
  • Feinberg, Joel (1965/1999). "Psychological Egoism." In Joel Feinberg & Russ Shafer-Landau (eds.), Reason and Responsibleness, tenth ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1999.  (Originally published in 1965 past Dickenson Pub. Co., based on materials composed for philosophy students at Brown University in 1958.)
    • A comprehensive word of philosophical arguments for and against psychological egoism. Rejects psychological egoism based primarily on traditional philosophical arguments.
  • Henson, Richard G. (1988). "Butler on Selfishness and Self-Love." Philosophy and Phenomenological Enquiry Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 31–57.
    • An examination of Butler's arguments against psychological egoism as they relate to selfishness. Henson chiefly argues that the "self-honey" crucial to egoism is non equivalent to selfishness.
  • Hobbes, Thomas (1651/1991). Leviathan. Reprinted in part in Raphael (1991) Vol. I, pp. 18–lx.
    • The archetype treatise on moral and political philosophy grounded in what is often considered a grim view of human nature. A classic estimation is that Hobbes holds a form of psychological egoism.
  • Hume, David (1751/1998). "Of Self-Love." Appendix Ii of his An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Tom L. Beauchamp (ed.), Oxford University Press.
    • A discussion of psychological egoism that is absent-minded from the Treatise. Largely endorses Butler's arguments against psychological egoism while offering some original considerations against it as well.
  • Hutcheson, Francis (1725/1991). An Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Dazzler and Virtue. Reprinted in office in Raphael (1991), Vol. I, pp. 260–321.  (Showtime printed in 1725.)
    • Argues against psychological egoism in a variety of ways, well-nigh notably past attempting to reveal how implausible it is on its face in one case its commitments are made clear. See especially Treatise Ii, An Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Adept.
  • May, Joshua (2011). "Egoism, Empathy, and Cocky-Other Merging." Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 49, Spindel Supplment: Empathy and Ideals, Remy Debes (ed.), pp. 25-39.
    • A critique of arguments for psychological egoism that entreatment to the thought that we blur the distinction between ourselves and others, especially when we experience empathy for them.
  • Mele, Alfred (2003). Motivation and Agency. New York:  Oxford University Printing.
    • Discusses a wide range of philosophical topics related to motivation. Although egoism isn't covered, ch. 1 provides a rich conceptual framework for discussing motivation in a broad range of contexts, such as a taxonomy of various desires.
  • Mercer, Mark. (2001). "In Defence of Weak Psychological Egoism." Erkenntnis Vol. 55, No. ii, pp. 217–237.
    • A recent defense of a form of psychological egoism that appeals to introspection and the purported unintelligibility of altruistic explanations of deportment.
  • Morillo, Carolyn (1990). "The Reward Outcome and Motivation." The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 87, No. four, pp. 169–186.
    • A recent defense of a kind of psychological hedonism based on work in neuroscience, peculiarly experiments on rats and their "pleasance centers."
  • Nagel, Thomas (1970/1978). The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton University Press. (Originally published in 1970, Oxford: Clarendon Press.)
    • A famous word of altruism and related topics. Focus, however, is not just to rebut egoistic theories of motivation but also neo-Humean desire-based ones, which are related more than to the distinct argue about the office of "reason" in motivation.
  • Nisbett, R. E. & T. D. Wilson (1977). "Telling More than Than We Tin Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes." Psychological Review Vol. 84, No. three, pp. 231–259.
    • A archetype empirical investigation into the reliability and nature of introspective reports on i'southward own mental states. Incertitude is cast on the extent to which we have direct introspective access to higher-order cerebral processes.
  • Oldenquist, Andrew (1980). "The Possibility of Selfishness." American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 25–33.
    • Argues that the natural state of humans is altruistic rather than egoistic. Emphasizes the importance of representations of oneself equally oneself or as "I" in egoistic desires.
  • Rachels, James. (2003). The Elements of Moral Philosophy, ivthursday ed. McGraw-Hill. (Showtime published in 1986.)
    • A pop contemporary introduction to moral philosophy. Ch. 5 contains a detailed discussion of psychological egoism. Like virtually philosophers, declares psychological egoism bankrupt based on the standard sorts of philosophical objections to it.
  • Raphael, D. D. (ed.) (1991). British Moralists: 1650-1800, 2 Vols. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett.
    • A two-book drove of the moral and political writings of British philosophers from effectually the 17th Century, including Hobbes, Butler, Hume, and Bentham.
  • Rosas, Alejandro (2002). "Psychological and Evolutionary Evidence for Altruism." Biology and Philosophy Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 93–107.
    • A critique of Sober and Wilson's claim that evolutionary theory resolves the egoism-altruism argue while social psychology doesn't. Rosas argues that they should treat both similarly given the folk psychological framework they both employ.
  • Sidgwick, Henry (1874/1907). The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publish Company. (Reprinted in 1981 from the printing by Macmillan and Co., Ltd. Offset edition published in 1874.)
    • A classic, comprehensive upstanding theory, which focuses on developing a kind of utilitarianism. A pregnant portion of it is devoted to various kinds of egoism. But he pretty clearly rejects psychological egoism, which is arguably contrary to several of his utilitarian predecessors.
  • Schroeder, Timothy (2004). Three Faces of Want. New York: Oxford University Press.
    • A philosopher'south defense of a reward-based theory of desire that is grounded in empirical work largely from neuroscience.  Schroeder argues that pleasure-based theories, similar Morillo'due south, are not supported by recent findings, which undermines her empirical footing for psychological hedonism.
  • Schroeder, Timothy, Adina Roskies, & Shaun Nichols (2010). "Moral Motivation." The Moral Psychology Handbook, John Doris & The Moral Psychology Research Group (eds.). Oxford University Press, pp. 72-110.
    • An examination of the neurological basis of moral motivation in the encephalon. Psychological hedonism is addressed briefly at the end.
  • Slote, Michael A. (1964). "An Empirical Basis for Psychological Egoism." Journal of Philosophy Vol. 61, No. 18, pp. 530–537.
    • A philosopher's defense of psychological egoism based on empirical piece of work in psychology at the fourth dimension, which was largely behavioristic in nature.
  • Sober, Elliott & D. S. Wilson (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Beliefs. Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press.
    • A widely celebrated and influential book by a philosopher and biologist containing a sustained test of the biological, psychological, and philosophical arguments for and confronting psychological egoism. They debate that philosophical arguments and Batson's work in social psychology exercise non provide sufficient evidence either way, whereas evolutionary theory does, based on a group selection model.
  • Stich, Stephen, John 1000. Doris, & Erica Roedder (2010). "Altruism." The Moral Psychology Handbook, John M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Inquiry Grouping (eds.). Oxford Academy Printing, pp. 147–205.
    • An overview of the philosophical, evolutionary, and psychological work relevant to the egoism-altruism debate. Focuses primarily on Sober and Wilson as well every bit Batson, arguing that psychological evidence has avant-garde the debate more than evolutionary arguments, though both are currently inconclusive.
  • Williams, Bernard (1973). "Egoism and Altruism." Ch. fifteen in Issues of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972, Cambridge University Press, pp. 250–265.
    • A discussion of egoism and altruism every bit related both to ethical theory and moral psychology. Williams considers and rejects various arguments for and confronting the existence of egoistic motives and the rationality of someone motivated past cocky-interest. He ultimately attempts to give a more Humean defense of altruism, as opposed to the more Kantian defenses found in Thomas Nagel, for case.
  • Warneken, Felix & Michael Tomasello (2007). "Helping and Cooperation at 14 Months of Historic period." Infancy Vol. 11, No. three, pp. 271–294.
    • Gathers empirical prove about the prosocial beliefs of young children—in particular that they will spontaneously help others who appear to exist in need.

Author Information

Joshua May
Email: joshmay@uab.edu
University of Alabama at Birmingham
U. S. A.